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I. INTRODUCTION
The objectivity of the expert witness . . . is one of the more
valued qualities that an expert hopes to bring to the legal
system, despite the latter’s necessarily partisan adversarial structure. Despite this ideal, dealing with bias constitutes one of the central challenges for expert witnesses in
the legal system. The issue has been considered throughout the history of forensic work.1
When the medical profession sets a moral standard that demands that a physician, testifying under oath in court,
must state his opinion fairly and fully without bias and
without regard to the side that calls him, neither suppressing nor over-emphasizing any aspect of the case, then, and
only then, you will have real medical expert testimony.2
Consider the following scenario: plaintiff, a former patient, sues
defendant-physician for medical negligence. An expert witnessphysician3 is engaged by defense counsel to testify at trial that the
care and treatment rendered by the defendant-physician complied
with the applicable standard of care.4 Fortuitously, the defendantphysician and the defendant-physician’s expert witness maintain
professional liability insurance with the same liability insurer.
Does this “common insurance”—insurance shared by the defendant

1. Michael Lamport Commons, Patrice Marie Miller & Thomas G. Gutheil, Expert Witness Perceptions of Bias in Experts, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 70, 70 (2004).
2. Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J. 247,
254 (1910).
3. For an explanation of the function of the medical expert witness, see Fred L. Cohen,
The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 185, 191–92 (2004).
4. See Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:
The “Accepted Practice” Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1236 (1975); Charles Markowitz,
Medical Standard of Care Jurisprudence as Evolutionary Process: Implications Under Managed Care, 2 YALE J. HEALTH, POL’Y L. & ETHICS 59, 59 (2002); Larry W. Myers, “The Battle
of the Experts:” A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 NEB. L. REV.
539, 539 (1965).
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and defense expert—establish expert witness bias, constituting ammunition for cross-examination at trial?5
It is well understood that “evidence” of the presence or absence of
liability insurance is simply inadmissible to prove fault, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Evidence 4116 (and similar state evidentiary
rules), which provides:
Rule 411—Liability Insurance
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible to prove whether the person acted
negligently or otherwise wrongfully. But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice or proving agency, ownership, or
control.7
But Rule 411 is not a complete bar to admissibility and allows the
trial court to admit evidence of liability insurance to prove “a witness’s bias or prejudice.”8 Is a medical expert witness more likely
to testify in support of the defendant-physician simply because of
common insurance? On the periphery, this argument for admissibility appears rather tenuous, but, beneath the surface, it may have
some traction. In the past ten to fifteen years, the common insurance question has received attention by state courts.9 A comprehensive examination of the topic is appropriate at this time.10
Essentially, the common insurance concern is as follows: an expert witness insured by the same professional liability insurer as
the defendant-physician has a financial interest in a jury verdict in
favor of defendant. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff would cause
5. See Steven Feola & Richard A. Alcorn, Expert Witness Advocacy: Changing Its Culture, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2009, at 24, 25 (urging that commonality of insurance is one of the
“[n]umerous factors [which] appear to cause or contribute to the problem of expert witness
advocacy”).
6. FED. R. EVID. 411.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Hawes v. Chua, 769 A.2d 797 (D.C. 2001); Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422 (Colo.
2000); Vasquez v. Rocco, 836 A.2d 1158 (Conn. 2003); Chambers v. Gwinnett Cmty. Hosp.,
Inc., 557 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Cetera v. DiFilippo, 934 N.E.2d 506 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010); Kan. Med. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 244 P.3d 642 (Kan. 2010); Woolum v. Hillman, 329
S.W.3d 283 (Ky. 2010); Anderson v. O’Rourke, 942 A.2d 680 (Me. 2008); Wells v. Tucker, 997
So. 2d 908 (Miss. 2008); Reimer v. Surgical Servs. of the Great Plains, P.C., 605 N.W.2d 777
(Neb. 2000); Cobb v. Shipman, 35 N.E.3d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); Schultz v. Mayfield Neurological Inst., No. C–120764, 2013 WL 5432103 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2013), appeal denied, 3 N.E.3d 1218 (Ohio 2014); Givens v. Sorrels, No. M2012–01712–COA–R3–CV, 2013
WL 4507946 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2013).
10. For a prior examination of this topic by a law student, see Maggie C. Bednar, Medical
Expert Witness Bias Due to Commonality of Insurance, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 403 (2002).
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the professional liability insurer to a pay a potentially sizeable sum
to the plaintiff and this payment (and other similar payments in
other litigation) would cause professional liability insurance premiums to increase to cover losses. Therefore, the defendant-physician’s expert would be financially motivated to testify in favor of the
defendant-physician. Of course, the concept of impeaching an expert witness by demonstrating financial interest in the litigation is
nothing new. A physician’s income derived from medico-legal consultation and testimony, the frequency of consultation, and the
party for whom the expert consults (plaintiff or defendant-physician) have always been proper subjects for cross-examination.11
Common insurance is different, and likely does not evidence more
than a theoretical, indirect financial interest of the medical defense
expert.
II. PURCHASING PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
AND PHYSICIAN NEGLIGENCE
As far back as 1954, a professor of legal medicine noted “[t]he
likelihood of being sued for malpractice is now so great that the
practicing physician must recognize that it constitutes a definite
occupational hazard.”12 Medical literature has reported efforts to
predict the risk of such claims.13 Therefore, a physician does not
purchase professional liability insurance because the physician is
planning to provide negligent care to patients. Professional liability
insurance, much like other liability insurance, is purchased consistent with the “[virtue] of spreading the risk of loss among many
to make it possible for the individual to bear the economic burden
of adversity.”14
Purchasing (or not purchasing) liability insurance does not evidence negligent conduct and, therefore, is not admissible to prove
fault pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 411.15 McCormick’s evidence treatise explains the policy supporting this exclusion:
11. See Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297 (Ill. 1988) (annual income from services related
to expert testimony; frequency with which expert testifies for plaintiffs/defendants); see also
Julie A. Correll, Trower v. Jones: Expanding the Scope of Permissible Cross-Examination of
Expert Witness, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1071 (1989); Michael H. Graham, Impeaching the Professional Expert Witness by a Showing of Financial Interest, 53 IND. L.J. 35, 38 (1977).
12. Louis J. Regan, Malpractice, An Occupational Hazard, 156 JAMA 1317, 1317 (1954).
13. See, e.g., Sara C. Charles et al., Predicting Risk for Medical Malpractice Claims Using
Quality-of-Care Characteristics, 157 W.J. MED. 433 (1992); Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 629 (2011).
14. Melvin M. Belli, The Social Value of Liability Insurance, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 169
(1961).
15. FED. R. EVID. 411.
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This rule rests on two premises. The first is the belief that
insurance coverage reveals little about the likelihood that
one will act carelessly. Subject to a few pathological exceptions, financial protection will not diminish the normal incentive to be careful, especially when life and limb are at
stake. Similarly, the argument that insured individuals or
firms are more prudent and careful, as a group, than those
who are self-insurers seems tenuous and also serves to
counteract any force that the first argument might have.
Thus, the relevance of the evidence of coverage is doubtful.16
As previously mentioned, Federal Rule of Evidence 411 provides
for evidence of insurance to prove witness bias or prejudice. How
might a medical negligence plaintiff develop this evidence?
Illinois is an excellent example of a state in which common professional liability insurance may be anticipated. As of 2012, Best’s
Statistical Study of U.S. Professional Liability—2012 Direct Premiums Written17 listed ISMIE Mutual Group (ISMIE) as the tenth
largest writer of medical professional liability insurance in the
United States.18 In its 2013 report, the Illinois Department of Insurance reported that, in 2011, ISMIE was the largest medical malpractice insurer in Illinois, covering 62.9% of the state’s market.19
ISMIE had an even larger market share, 72.3%, in medical/surgical
coverage and a 77.8% market share in other/not classified coverage.20 Therefore, it is predictable that an Illinois physician-defendant will be insured by ISMIE. If that physician retains an expert
witness-physician who practices medicine in Illinois, it is also likely
that the expert will have ISMIE coverage.
The Illinois Rules of Evidence (IRE) include IRE 411, which provides:
Rule 411—Liability Insurance
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person
acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does
16.
17.

KENNETH BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 427 (7th ed. 2013).
BESTLINK, BEST’S STATISTICAL STUDY, U.S. MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY—2012
DIRECT PREMIUMS WRITTEN 1 (2013).
18. Id.
19. ILL. DEP’T OF INS., 2013 COST CONTAINMENT ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 21 (2013).
20. Id. at 22.
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not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against
liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of
agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.21
Thus, IRE 411 contemplates the admissibility of evidence of insurance to demonstrate witness bias, as does FRE 411. Is it, therefore, reasonable to conclude that, in Illinois, a state in which common insurance between a physician-defendant and the expert-physician is predictable, evidence of common insurance should be admissible to provide expert witness bias? Of course, if the plaintiff
retains an Illinois physician as an expert witness and that physician shares common insurance with the defendant-physician, is
that expert more credible due to a willingness to provide testimony
that may support a verdict to be paid by a common insurance provider? That position is no more logical than the rationale “suggesting” common insurance bias when focusing on the defense expert.
In order to explore potential common insurance and expert witness bias, it is helpful to examine an important model of professional liability insurance. Professor Tom Baker at the University
of Connecticut School of Law noted that “physician-controlled mutual insurance companies have a very significant market share in
many states.”22 As reported in 1991, “[o]ver half of the total dollar
volume of physicians’ malpractice insurance is now written by physician-owned mutual companies.”23 Furthermore, “[m]utual insurance companies by definition are owned entirely by their policyholders. Any profits earned are returned to policyholders in the form of
dividend distributions or reduced future premiums.”24 The argument, then, is that physicians insured by mutual professional liability insurers directly benefit in profitable years by receiving dividend payments from their insurers. The expert witness-physician,
therefore, gains a direct financial benefit if the common insurer is
not required to pay jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs.
21. ILL. R. EVID. 411
22. Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL
L. REV. 393, 428 (2005).
23. Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 59
(1991).
24. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CAPITAL MARKETS SPECIAL REPORT (2015),
http://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/150428.htm. See also J.A.C. Hetherington,
Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance Companies, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 1068 (1969); Gary
Kreider, Who Owns the Mutuals? Proposals for Reform of Membership Rights in Mutual Insurance and Banking Companies, 41 CIN. L REV. 275 (1972); Joan Lamm-Tennant & Laura
T. Starks, Stock Versus Mutual Ownership Structures: The Risk Implications, 66 J. BUS. 29
(1993).
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This argument is, presumably, the Rule 41125 argument in favor
of admissibility. The basic weakness of this argument is that the
defendant’s expert witness-physician is more likely to testify in support of the defendant-physician because the expert actually believes
that malpractice did not occur and that the medical care and treatment provided by the defendant complied with the applicable standard of care. A more cynical view of medical expert witnesses and
testimonial bias is that medical experts are very intelligent and understand that litigation is adversarial. Perhaps expert X, retained
by plaintiff, would have been comfortable testifying for the defendant-physician, if only defense counsel would have contacted expert
X before plaintiff’s counsel did. This scenario simply suggests that
medical experts are intelligent mercenaries, capable of convincing
juries of either a plaintiff’s or defendant’s position in any given medical negligence case. That is a problem, which, I suggest, overwhelms the likelihood that common insurance influences a medical
expert’s testimony.
A corollary to the common insurance “bias” is that common professional liability insurers are directly or indirectly compensating
the defendant-physician’s expert for consulting, testifying at a deposition, and testifying at trial. Arguably, compensation of expert
witness fees by a common professional liability insurer and administrative involvement of the expert witness with the common insurer further complicates the issue.
III. SURVEYING THE STATES
The common insurance basis for medical expert witness bias is
due for comprehensive analysis and comment. To do so requires an
examination of various jurisdictions that have addressed this issue.
A. Ohio—The Per Se Rule of Admissibility
The 1994 seminal case in Ohio is Ede v. Atrium South OB-GYN,26
in which the Supreme Court of Ohio pronounced that evidence of
common insurance between a physician-defendant and the physician-defendant’s medical expert “is sufficiently probative of the expert’s bias as to clearly outweigh any potential prejudice evidence
of insurance might cause.”27 In Ede, the Supreme Court was confronted with common professional liability coverage provided by a
25.
26.
27.

FED. R. EVID. 411.
Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, 642 N.E.2d 365 (Ohio 1994).
Id. at 368.
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mutual professional liability insurer.28 Plaintiff urged that “each
insured’s policy is evidence of some fractional part ownership in [the
insurer],”29 creating a “built-in-bias—fewer successful malpractice
claims means lower premiums charged for malpractice insurance.”30 The Supreme Court was quite critical of the trial court’s
refusal to consider any potential bias that might result from fractional ownership in a mutual professional liability insurer31 and
pronounced the aforementioned rigid rule of admissibility.32
Remarkably, in 2015, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, in Cobb v.
Shipman,33 applied the Ede rule of common insurance admissibility34 even when the defendant-physician’s expert was unaware of
the existence of common insurance. Apparently, the expert’s unawareness of common insurance simply constitutes a credibility consideration.35 It is difficult to explain this implicit or subliminal bias.
The Ede dissent36 aptly pointed out that the majority opinion
stated: “[t]he scope of cross-examination of a medical expert on the
questions of the expert’s bias and pecuniary interest and the admissibility of evidence relating thereto are matters that rest in the
sound discretion of the trial court,”37 and that a per se rule of admissibility removes the trial court’s discretion.38 The dissent further suggested that the majority created a new Ohio rule of evidence and, “in doing so, has circumvented the proper rulemaking
procedures required by the Ohio Constitution.”39
Worthy of note is the 2013 opinion of the Court of Appeals of Ohio
in Schultz v. Mayfield Neurological Institute.40 Here, the Court of
Appeals reviewed a defense verdict following a bench trial. The
trial judge precluded the plaintiff from cross-examining the defendant’s medical expert regarding common professional liability insurance.41
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals stated:

28. Id. at 366.
29. Id. at 366.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 368.
32. Id.
33. Cobb v. Shipman, 35 N.E.3d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
34. Ede, 642 N.E.2d at 368.
35. Cobb, 35 N.E.3d at 574.
36. Ede, 642 N.E.2d at 369 (Wright, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 369 (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 369–70.
39. Id.
40. Schultz v. Mayfield Neurological Inst., No. C–120764, 2013 WL 5432103 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 25, 2013).
41. Id. at *2.
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On the facts of this case, even if the trial court erred by
excluding the testimony, we cannot say that the Schultzes’
substantial rights were prejudiced as a result. The concerns expressed by the Ede court with respect to jury determinations were not present here—this was a bench trial
where both parties had ample opportunity to argue their
positions on the commonality-of-insurance matter directly
to the trier of fact. So the Schultzes cannot demonstrate
that the outcome of the trial would have been otherwise
had the testimony not been excluded. Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.42
On the periphery, this statement seems harmless. The problem
is “the ample opportunity to argue their positions on the commonality-of-insurance matter directly to the trier of fact.”43 The Court
of Appeals does not explain this opportunity. How could the trial
court consider this issue in the absence of evidence? Without the
evidence, how does the Schultz opinion44 conform to the Ede rule,45
even in the absence of a jury trial? I am not advocating Ede46 as the
sensible approach to evidence of common insurance. I am simply
suggesting that the effort of the Court of Appeals in Schultz47 to
explain away the trial court’s departure from Ede48 is dubious.
The rigid, per se Ohio rule of admissibility does not address a very
real evidentiary problem: What type of evidence will be necessary
to prove or disprove bias allegedly resulting from common insurance? Representatives of the common insurer will need to testify
about the structure of the insurer, the calculation of premiums, the
determination of whether dividends may be payable to various
member insureds in a given year, how jury verdicts affect the actual
premium paid by a specific physician-insured, financial statements
and, perhaps, other topics. These items are, of course, collateral to
the issues of the alleged medical negligence. Accordingly, the Ohio
rule applied to simple common insurance, without more, will likely
create jury distraction and confusion, and will not yield relevant
evidence probative of expert witness bias.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at *3.
Id.
See generally id.
Ede, 642 N.E.2d at 368.
Id.
Schultz, 2013 WL 5432103, at *2–3.
Ede, 642 N.E.2d at 368.
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B. Kansas—Strict Exclusion or Not Quite So Strict?
As recently as 2010, the Supreme Court of Kansas suggested that
evidence of common insurance should not be admissible to demonstrate expert witness bias. In Kansas Medical Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Svaty,49 the Kansas Supreme Court considered the propriety
of an order requiring a mutual professional liability insurer, which
insured a defense expert but not the defendant, to disclose insurance information regarding the defense expert. In its lengthy opinion, the Supreme Court noted that this was not a case of common
insurance since “the defense expert[ ] is insured by a company that
is the servicing carrier for [the defendant physician’s] insurance
plan.”50 However, the Supreme Court also noted that “[plaintiff]
would have a stronger argument [for expert witness bias] if, as initially believed, [defendant] and [defendant’s expert] were both insured by the same member-owned insurance company.”51
Despite this comment, suggesting that the Supreme Court might
be receptive to an argument alleging expert witness bias due to
common insurance, the Court reviewed the common insurance jurisprudence of other jurisdictions. The Court acknowledged Ohio’s
per se rule of admissibility but then referred to “Kansas’ long-standing position that insurance should not be interjected [at] trial.”52
The Court also reflected on Kansas jurisprudence “in which attorneys sought to determine juror bias by asking jurors during voir
dire whether they were members of or stockholders in insurance
companies,”53 a practice uniformly condemned by the Supreme
Court.54 Significantly, the Supreme Court stated that its prior opinions “reject arguments that the financial connection of buying insurance in the same market or even having a joint ownership interest in an insurance company is a bias that would disqualify a potential juror or is of the nature that warrants interjection of insurance into a liability trial.”55
If the Kansas Medical Mutual Insurance Co.56 opinion appeared
to embrace the exclusion of evidence of common insurance, the
Court of Appeals of Kansas more recently may have retreated from
this stance in Hamrick v. Huebner,57 an unpublished opinion in
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Kan. Med. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 244 P.3d 642 (Kan. 2010).
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663–64.
See generally id.
Hamrick v. Huebner, No. 106,215, 2012 WL 2785930 (Kan. Ct. App. July 6, 2012).
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2012. In Hamrick, the trial court excluded evidence that the defendant and his expert witnesses were insured by the same mutual
professional liability insurer.58 Plaintiff argued that “a judgment
against [the defendant] could adversely affect [his experts’] medical
liability insurance premiums.”59 The defense experts “testified that
they were unaware of their common insurance carrier until it was
pointed out by [plaintiff].”60 The Court of Appeals cited Kansas
Medical Mutual Insurance Co. as reflecting Kansas’ policy of excluding evidence of insurance at trial,61 but then stated:
[W]e conclude that given the fact that the experts did not
know they shared a common insurer with [defendant] until
after they had formulated and disclosed their opinions in
the case, the proffered evidence did not have any tendency
in reason to prove bias on the part of the witnesses. Further, if the evidence did have any probative value, it was so
slight that it was clearly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The district court did not err in excluding this testimony.62
The Hamrick opinion may have retreated from a policy of complete exclusion of common insurance evidence, due to the reference
to the timing of the experts’ knowledge of common insurance.63 If
so, until the Supreme Court of Kansas again speaks to this issue,
the state of the law in Kansas seems unclear.
C. Mississippi—Strict Exclusion
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has taken a tough stance
against the admission of common insurance evidence. In Wells v.
Tucker,64 the Mississippi Supreme Court characterized the gist of
the controversy as follows:
The central issue on appeal involves the fact that Dr.
Tucker and some, if not all of his experts were members of,
and had their medical malpractice liability policies
through, the same insurer—Medical Assurance Company
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2 (citing Kan. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 244 P.3d 642).
Id. at *3 (relying on Kan. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 244 P.3d at 663–64).
Id. at *2.
997 So. 2d 908 (Miss. 2008).
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of Mississippi (MACM). A nonprofit corporation, MACM is
a limited pool of Mississippi physicians who are self-insured for protection against medical negligence suits.65
The trial court refused to allow the common insurance-based
cross-examination of the expert witnesses.66 The Court of Appeals
reversed this ruling based on calculations of insurance equity accounts in the event of an adverse verdict and on the calculations of
premiums in the event of settlements or plaintiffs’ verdicts.67
The Supreme Court favorably referred to the dissent in the Court
of Appeals, which highlighted the experts’ testimony “of economic
or financial bias.”68 The jury heard testimony of the hourly rates
paid to plaintiff’s and defendant’s experts for their work.69 The experts could have been, but were not, asked to testify about the total
sums they received for their work as experts in the case and the
number of times and for whom they have testified.70 A verdict
against the defendant might have affected the equity accounts of
member physicians by $136.71 Interestingly, the Court of Appeals
dissent noted that the majority opinion, supporting the admissibility of common insurance, would yield “the practical impact”72 of limiting the medical expert witness pool (presumably for defendants)
in Mississippi cases to non-Mississippi physicians.73
Adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals dissent, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding, common insurance, alone, is not sufficient to evidence medical
defense expert witness bias in Mississippi.74
D.

Common Insurance—“Plus”

Ohio appears to be the only jurisdiction adopting a per se rule of
admissibility for common insurance alone—professional liability insurance carried by the defendant-physician and the defendant-physician’s expert provided by the same insurer, typically a mutual,

65. Id. at 909.
66. Id. at 910–11.
67. Id. at 913–14.
68. Id. at 916 (citing Wells v. Tucker, 997 So. 2d 925, 940 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (Griffins,
J., dissenting)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 917
73. Id.
74. Id. at 917.
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“physician-owned” company.75 This per se rule ignores the evidentiary problem associated with it: What type of evidence is necessary
to show bias arising from common insurance? How many insurance
company executives must testify to the intricacies of the mutual insurance business? Is it possible to prove that a plaintiff’s verdict in
a single case could cause an insurance premium to increase such
that a defense expert witness would be biased to testify for the defendant-physician simply due to common insurance? The Ohio approach seems unrealistic and unfair. It would yield much collateral
evidence which could distract the jury from the central issue in the
litigation—whether the care and treatment rendered by the defendant-physician complied with the applicable standard of care.
Fortunately, the Ohio rule has not tempted other jurisdictions,
which have adopted a common insurance “plus” analysis. This more
reasonable approach, consistent with classic cross-examination of
medical expert witnesses, actually consists of multiple variants,
now to be explored by this paper.
1. More Than a Cursory Interest—Significant Economic Services Test (Illinois)
Illinois has rejected the admissibility of common insurance alone
through two Appellate Court opinions,76 the latest of which was delivered in 2010. In Golden v. Kiswaukee Community Health Services Center,77 a case of first impression, the Appellate Court focused on a commonly insured expert who “performed significant
economic services for [the insurer] in reviewing claims made
against the [insurer’s] doctor members to determine if those suits
should have any impact on the insurance premiums they pay.”78
Furthermore, the Appellate Court noted that “[t]he possibility of
some significant question of bias exceeding potential prejudice
should have been recognized by the court in this instance. The benefit to the [insurer] in premium adjustments that take place is ineluctable.”79
More recently, in Cetera v. Difilippo the Appellate Court rejected
evidence of common insurance, alone, to demonstrate expert witness bias.80 The Appellate Court favorably referred to the Golden
75. Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, 642 N.E.2d 365, 368 (Ohio 1994).
76. Cetera v. DiFilippo, 934 N.E.2d 506, 524–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Golden v. Kiswaukee
Cmty. Health Servs. Ctr., Inc., 645 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
77. Golden, 645 N.E.2d 319.
78. Id. at 325.
79. Id.
80. Cetera, 934 N.E.2d at 524–25.
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Court’s adoption of the significant economic services analysis,
which focuses on the actual services performed by the medical expert for the common insurer.81
2. The “Exceptional Case” Test (Arizona)
In 1988, the Supreme Court of Arizona recognized that evidence
beyond common insurance was necessary to establish the potential
bias of a defendant-physician’s medical expert witness. In Barsema
v. Susong82 the Supreme Court considered a medical negligence
claim against a physician insured by an insurance company organized as a mutual insurer. “One of defendant’s expert witnesses
was . . . allegedly a MICA [Mutual Insurance Company of Arizona]
shareholder and insured.”83 The expert “was a vice president and
member of MICA’s board of directors.”84 He “was compensated for
the duties he performed”85 for the common insurer and “his duties
as a board member included trying to keep premiums low.”86 Pursuant to an Arizona statute prohibiting the introduction of insurance-related evidence at a medical negligence trial,87 the trial court
granted a motion in limine designed to exclude the evidence of the
relationship of the expert witness with the common insurer.88
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the aforementioned statute was unconstitutional as it was contrary to the Arizona Rules of
Evidence, particularly Rules 401, 403, and 411.89 The Supreme
Court pronounced that “[i]n all but the exceptional case, a trial
judge applying Rule 403 should hold that the danger of prejudice
resulting from the interjection of insurance evidence substantially
outweighs the probative value of evidence that the witness and a
party have a common insurer.”90 The Supreme Court held that the
trial court “erred in precluding the introduction of evidence that
[the expert witness] was [the common insurer’s] vice president and
a member of its board of directors.”91

81. Id. (citing Golden 465 N.E.2d 319).
82. Barsema v. Susong, 751 P.2d 969, 971 (Ariz. 1988).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 971–72 (citing Non-admissibility of Certain Types of Evidence Relating to Professional Liability Insurance, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12–569 (2016)).
88. Id. at 971–72.
89. Id. at 971–74 (citing ARIZ. R. EVID. 401, 403 & 411).
90. Id. at 973.
91. Id. at 974.
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3. The Direct Interest Test (Nebraska)
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Reimer v. Surgical Services
of the Great Plains,92 recognized that evidence of common insurance
between the defendant-physician and defendant’s medical expert
“indicate[s] only a remote possibility of bias.”93 Citing Texas authority,94 the Supreme Court stated that “absent evidence that a
witness has a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation, such
as an agent, owner, or employee of the defendant’s insurer, the potential for bias is too remote and is outweighed by the prejudice its
admission would cause.”95 No such evidence existed in Reimer beyond common insurance.96
4. The Strong Connection Test (Kentucky)
In 2010, in Woolum v. Hillman the Supreme Court of Kentucky
adopted a strong connection test for the admissibility of common
insurance and related evidence to demonstrate expert witness
bias.97 Unfortunately, a close examination of Woolum reveals a
troubling analysis by the Court.98
Woolum involved a defendant-physician and expert with a common liability insurer.99 To be sure, the defense expert was concerned about the impact an adverse verdict would have on the cost
of his insurance premiums.100 Moreover, at his deposition, the defense expert “described how several malpractice claims against his
former liability insurer had driven up his premiums and eventually
drove the insurer into bankruptcy, effectively forcing him out of
practice in Mississippi.”101 The trial court denied the defendantphysician’s motion to exclude this evidence and “then permitted evidence of the common insurance coverage to be introduced at
trial.”102

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Reimer v. Surgical Servs. of the Great Plains, P.C., 605 N.W.2d 777 (Neb. 2000).
Id. at 781.
Id. (citing Mendoza v. Varon, 563 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)).
Id.
Id.
Woolum v. Hillman, 329 S.W.3d 283 (Ky. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 286–87.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id.

354

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 55

The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the Ohio per se admissibility rule pronounced in Ede103 and then focused on the factors supporting the trial court’s decision to admit common insurance evidence at trial:
•
•
•
•
•

The defense expert’s “belief and opinion that malpractice
cases result in, and have a direct link to, rate increases.”104
The defense expert’s belief of “collusion between judges and
lawyers in malpractice cases.”105
The defense expert’s severe comments during his deposition.106
The defense expert’s “general hostility to medical negligence
cases.”107
The defense expert and the defendant-physician “had worked
side by side for twenty years in the same community hospital.”108

These “factors” are curious because, other than the first listed,
the remaining factors are likely appropriate ammunition for crossexamination, without any reference to common insurance. The Supreme Court actually recognized this.109 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded “these factors also develop a link between the shared insurance and [the expert’s] bias against this malpractice claim. They
demonstrate [the expert] is no average, passive policyholder, but
instead a practitioner very concerned with the affairs of his insurer.”110 Finally, the Supreme Court stated, “[a]s a result of the
strong connection between common insurance and witness bias, it
was not an abuse of discretion to admit this evidence.”111
Kentucky’s strong connection test, five years earlier referred to
as “a more compelling degree of connection” test,112 may be reasonable. However, the requisite connection must be between the common insurance and expert witness bias. The Woolum opinion
misses the mark.113 It may be fair to suggest that any physician is
concerned about potential increases to insurance premiums. The
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 288 (citing Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, 642 N.E.2d 365, 368 (Ohio 1994)).
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 290.
Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 447 (Ky. 2005).
Woolum, 329 S.W.3d at 289–90.
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other “factors” emphasized in Woolum are unrelated to common insurance and would have been proper topics for cross-examination of
the defense expert in any event.114
5. The Substantial Connection Test
After surveying jurisdictions that have considered the admissibility of common insurance to establish expert witness bias, it is
apparent that the substantial connection test is the most often utilized. The substantial connection test operates to exclude evidence
of common insurance, alone. Instead, it focuses on specific links of
the defense expert to the common professional liability insurer, typically a mutual company. Substantial connection examples may be
distilled from reviewing the jurisprudence of Colorado,115 Connecticut,116 Georgia,117 Maine118 and Oklahoma,119 as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Co-founded the insurance trust120
Sat on the original board of directors121
Founded the insurer to provide good quality dentists with
affordable insurance and to benefit the public122
Testified that an adverse judgment could impact the expert financially123
Had an employment relationship with the insurer124
Received an annual salary from the insurer125
Set the compensation paid by the insurer for expert testimony126
Reviewed claims for the insurer127

Certainly, any of these examples in combination, and possibly
alone, in addition to evidence of common insurance, should satisfy
the substantial connection test for admissibility.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422 (Colo. 2000).
Vasquez v. Rocco, 836 A.2d 1158 (Conn. 2003).
Chambers v. Gwinnett Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
Anderson v. O’Rourke, 942 A.2d 680 (Me. 2008).
Mills v. Grotheer, 957 P.2d 540 (Okla. 1998).
Vasquez, 836 A.2d at 1165; Bonser, 3 P.3d at 426; Chambers, 557 S.E.2d at 416.
Vasquez, 836 A.2d at 1165; Bonser, 3 P.3d at 426; Chambers, 557 S.E.2d at 416.
Bonser, 3 P.3d at 426.
Id.
Chambers, 557 S.E.2d at 416; Mills, 957 P.2d at 543.
Anderson v. O’Rourke, 942 A.2d 680, 684 (Me. 2008).
Id.
Id.; Mills, 957 P.2d at 543.
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E. The Indiana Patient Compensation Fund
The State of Indiana maintains a statutorily-created Patient
Compensation Fund128 which assists in paying medical malpractice
damages:
The [Patient Compensation Fund] is administered by the
Indiana Department of Insurance . . . and overseen by the
insurance commissioner . . . . The [Patient Compensation
Fund] is used to pay out large medical malpractice claims
levied against an eligible provider . . . . The [Patient Compensation Fund] takes effect when a claim exceeds
$250,000. The health care professional’s primary insurer
is required to pay up to $250,000 either by judgment of
more than $250,000 or by agreeing to settle for $250,000
and then the court orders a remedy in excess of that
amount . . . . After a settlement or judgment is reached, the
defendant hospital or physician is removed from the process and the [Patient Compensation Fund] comes into play
. . . . [T]his provision . . . positions the State as the insurer
for a large portion of a medical malpractice claim if the
judgment grants the maximum recovery to the claimant.129
In 2012, the Court of Appeals of Indiana discussed the Indiana
Patient Compensation Fund in Tucker v. Harrison.130 Here, the patient sought to introduce evidence that every Indiana physician is
biased as they all participate in the Fund, “which acts as a sort of
supplemental mutual insurance provider for all qualified
healthcare providers licensed in Indiana, and therefore have a financial interest in whether payouts are made from the Fund.”131
By state statute, all Indiana-licensed physicians must be available
to serve as members of a review panel and each panel member must
take an oath to render a non-biased opinion.132 Under Indiana law,
all medical negligence complaints are reviewed by a panel consisting of an attorney and three health care providers.133 The Court of
128. IND. CODE ANN. § 34–18–6–1 (LexisNexis 2017).
129. Bruce D. Jones, Unfair and Harsh Results of Contributory Negligence Lives in Indiana: The Indiana Medical Malpractice System and the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, 6 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 107, 115–16 (2009). See also Frank A. Sloan et al., Public Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Analysis of State-Operated Patient Compensation Funds, 54 DEPAUL. L.
REV. 247 (2005).
130. 973 N.E.2d 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
131. Id. at 54.
132. IND. CODE. ANN. § 34–18–10–17(e) (LexisNexis 2017).
133. IND. CODE. ANN. § 34–18–10–3 (LexisNexis 2017).
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Appeals rejected the notion that any physician’s participation in the
Fund’s required process evidenced any more than a remote potential for bias.134
IV. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE (THEORETICAL) COMMON INSURANCE
BIAS?
Presumably, the common insurance “plus” bias suggests that the
physician-defendant’s medical expert, who “shares” a liability insurer with the defendant, will be inclined to support the defendant
at trial due to a financial interest in a verdict favorable to the defendant. Of course, the common insurance “plus” bias is not disqualifying—it is simply ammunition for cross-examination of the
defense expert as “bias” is relevant to the weight of testimony, not
admissibility. Cross-examination of the defense expert does not occur until the expert, on direct examination, has testified to standard
of care opinions that support the defendant-physician. Therefore,
logic dictates that expert witness bias is revealed in the substance
of the expert’s testimony, which favors the defendant-physician because of the bias.
Of course, I am mindful of another position, attractive to plaintiffs, which urges the admissibility of common insurance “plus” to
demonstrate bias. This position is, essentially, analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence 609,135 which provides for witness impeachment by evidence of a criminal conviction. Rule 609 “[m]odern practice rests upon the assumption that certain convictions of a witness
are probative of lack of credibility, or as courts have suggested, that
a witness’s demonstrated willingness to engage in antisocial conduct in one instance is probative of willingness to give false testimony.”136 Rule 609 does not require any causative link to particular
testimony. The party successfully impeaching a witness with a
prior conviction can argue to the jury that the witness is simply not
honest and not credible, due to the prior conviction. It is unlikely
that such a deep-rooted policy supports the Rule 411137 admissibility of insurance to demonstrate witness bias. It seems a stretch to
urge that a commonly-insured defense expert witness will testify in
support of the defendant purely as a result of the common insurance. If a plaintiff urges that a defense expert is biased only due to
common insurance and any other link to the common insurer, the
134.
135.
136.

Tucker, 973 N.E.2d at 55.
FED. R. EVID. 609.
GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 377 (7th ed. 2011).
137. FED. R. EVID. 411.
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defendant must interpose a Rule 403138 objection, urging that the
resulting distraction and trial of collateral matters outweighs any
conceivable probative value of common insurance.
Would a medical expert witness, testifying on behalf of a defendant-physician, give false testimony as a result of a supposed common insurance “plus” bias? It is possible but, I suspect, unlikely
due to the extraordinarily weak link between the financial interest
of an expert witness and the outcome of the trial. In states such as
Illinois, in which one professional liability insurer dominates the
market, many highly-qualified, objective experts share an insurer
with defendant-physicians. They are willing to testify on behalf of
defendant-physicians, not because they share a professional liability insurer, but because they believe that the medical care provided
was appropriate. This, in my opinion, is why the Ohio per se rule
of admissibility and, perhaps, the common insurance “plus” rule of
admissibility,139 are flawed. To borrow a concept from tort law, neither model embraces a “causation” component—neither model requires a showing that the alleged bias produces specific false testimony.
There is another issue worthy of mention at this point. This paper has not focused on the question of whether jurors are influenced
by hearing evidence of insurance because it is distinct from the
question of witness bias. Will testimony at trial about the defendant-physician’s and defense expert’s common insurer cause the jury
to enter a verdict for the plaintiff, and, perhaps, inflate a verdict
because the jury is aware of the existence of professional liability
insurance to cover the loss? This topic has received significant attention in the literature over a lengthy period of time.140 This issue,
of course, relates to the primary function of Federal Rule of Evidence 411141—to exclude evidence of the presence or absence of insurance to prove negligence. Expert witness bias due to common
insurance relates to witness credibility, not liability. FRE 411
clearly distinguishes these concerns and so does this paper.

138. FED. R. EVID. 403.
139. Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, 642 N.E.2d 365, 366, 368 (Ohio 1994).
140. See, e.g., Alan Calnan, The Insurance Exclusionary Rule Revisited: Are Reports of its
Demise Exaggerated?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1177 (1991); Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The
Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability Insurance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1998);
J.E. Lyerly, Evidence: Revealing the Existence of Defendant’s Liability Insurance to the Jury,
6 CUMB. L. REV. 123 (1975); R. Pettigrew, Another Look at That Forbidden Word—Insurance,
10 FLA. L. REV. 68 (1957).
141. FED. R. EVID. 411.
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V. THE RISK ASSUMED BY THE DEFENDANT’S BIASED MEDICAL
EXPERT WITNESS
The problem created by the biased defendant’s medical expert
witness (or the biased plaintiff’s medical expert witness) is inherent
in expert witness testimony. Expert medical witnesses are intelligent, influential, and believable. These “qualities” yield the potential for false testimony, incapable of recognition by the jury. The
medical expert who falsifies testimony in order to support a litigant
is, at trial, subject to cross-examination on matters of testimonial
substance and credibility.142 But expert witnesses who falsify their
testimony will know more about the subject matter of their testimony than the cross-examining attorney,143 may be believable, and
their testimony may cause the entry of verdicts based on purposefully erroneous testimony.
Returning to the focus of this paper—common insurance—does
the defendant’s medical expert bear any professional risk if the expert’s bias results in false trial testimony? If so, is the risk so great
that it likely outweighs the reward—a verdict in favor of the defendant-physician?
A. The Risk That the Expert’s Medical License Will Be Disciplined
The licensure of physicians is governed by state law.144 The practice of medicine is defined by state law (including state court decisions)145 and state law provides the vehicle by which physicians’ licenses may be disciplined.146 “[M]ost states authorize discipline under a broad category of “unprofessional conduct,” which may include
violations of codes of medical ethics, conduct that brings the medical
profession into disrepute, or other unspecified forms of “dishonorable conduct,” including criminal acts (typically felonies or crimes of
‘moral turpitude’).”147 Medical literature suggests that physician
142. FED. R. EVID. 611(b) (“Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of
the direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility. The court may allow
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.”).
143. Jennifer A. Turner, Going After the ‘Hired Guns’: Is Improper Expert Witness Testimony Unprofessional Conduct or the Negligent Practice of Medicine?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 275,
288 (2006).
144. See BARRY FURROW ET AL., LAW AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY, PATIENT SAFETY, AND
MEDICAL LIABILITY 65 (7th ed. 2013); Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the
Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 286 (2010); Patricia J.
Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 434
(2015).
145. Sawicki, supra note 144, at 290; Zettler, supra note 144, at 435–36.
146. See James Morrison & Peter Wickersham, Physicians Disciplined by a State Medical
Board, 279 JAMA 1889 (1998); Sawicki, supra note 144, at 290.
147. Sawicki, supra note 144, at 293.
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license discipline occurs largely for the following reasons: substance
abuse, criminal conduct, sexual contact with patients, prescribing
violations, financial improprieties, negligence, incompetence, and
unprofessional conduct.148 The Federation of State Medical Boards
has published a lengthy list of examples of unprofessional conduct,149 but false medical expert testimony is absent from this list.
Even with these various categories of physician conduct which
could lead to license discipline, it has been reported that “medical
boards only take disciplinary action against less than one-half of
one percent of physicians annually . . . .”150
There is very little reported judicial precedent relating to the
question of whether false medical expert witness testimony is a
proper subject for license discipline. In Joseph v. D.C. Board of
Medicine,151 a physician’s license was disciplined in Maryland for
“false testimony and misrepresentations made by him in his capacity as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case, [which] constituted a false report in the practice of medicine . . . .”152 The District of Columbia licensing board then instituted a disciplinary proceeding against the physician and determined that giving testimony as a non-treating expert witness “is in the nature of giving a
second opinion”153 and arises from the practice of medicine.154 The
Court of Appeals found that the physician, as an expert witness,
was involved in the diagnostic process.155 The decision of the District of Columbia Board of Medicine was affirmed.156
In the same year Joseph157 was decided, the Missouri Court of
Appeals decided Missouri Board of Registration for the Healing Arts
v. Levine (“Missouri Board”),158 holding that “acting as a non-treat-

148. See Neal D. Kohatsu, Characteristics Associated with Physician Discipline, 164
ARCH. INTERN. MED. 653, 655 (2004); Morrison & Wickersham, supra note 146, at 1890.
149. FEDERATION OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS
7 (May 2014).
150. Sawicki, supra note 144, at 287.
151. Joseph v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085, 1086 (D.C. 1991).
152. Id. at 1086.
153. Id. at 1087.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1089, 1091.
156. Id. at 1091.
157. Id. at 1085.
158. Mo. Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Levine, 808 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991).
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ing expert medical witness does not constitute the practice of medicine or the function or duty of a licensee . . . .”159 Dr. Levine’s alleged transgression had been false testimony regarding the number
of attempts necessary to pass a board certification exam.160
More recently, the Court of Appeals of Mississippi, in Mississippi
State Board of Medical Licensure v. Harron,161 considered an interesting medical licensure matter involving expert testimony. Unlike
in Joseph162 and Missouri Board,163 Dr. Harron was a physician involved in “producing diagnostic reports on 6,700 of the claimants in
the Texas [silicosis]164 litigation,”165 and “was listed as the diagnosing physician on 2,600 of these claims.”166 He “testified about his
practices of letting medically untrained secretaries and typists interpret his reports, insert a diagnosis, stamp his signature on the
reports, and sent them out with no review by him.”167 Dr. Harron’s
medical license was disciplined as a result of this conduct but, on
review, the Chancery Court “ruled that the Board had no jurisdiction to discipline Dr. Harron because his actions were as an expert
witness and he was not engaged in the practice of medicine.”168
In reversing the decision of the Chancery Court, the Court of Appeals used quite broad language in pronouncing that “the [licensing] Board’s jurisdiction to discipline doctors is not limited to situations where the doctor is actually practicing medicine on a particular patient.”169 Typically, expert medical testimony of the type discussed in this paper does not involve patient treatment by the expert. Standard of care and causation opinions are most often derived from the expert’s review of medical and hospital records, deposition testimony, literature, and the expert’s education, training,
and experience. Yet, the Court of Appeals did note that Dr. Harron
was, in fact, a diagnosing physician for many patients when he testified as an expert witness.170 Therefore, despite the specific facts

159. Id. at 443.
160. Id. at 441.
161. Miss. State Bd. of Med. Licensure v. Harron, 163 So.3d 945 (Miss. App. 2014).
162. Joseph, 587 A.2d 1085.
163. Levine, 808 S.W.2d 440.
164. Brooke T. Mossman & Andrew Churg, Mechanisms in the Pathogenesis of Asbestosis
and Silicosis, 157 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1666, 1667 (1998) (“Silicosis is
disease produced by inhalation of one of the forms of crystalline silica, most commonly
quartz.”).
165. Harron, 163 So.3d at 945.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 951.
169. Id. at 952.
170. Id. at 953–54.
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in Harron,171 the opinion may very well support the position that
classic medical expert witness testimony constitutes the practice of
medicine.
Medical and legal scholarship has reported that the American
Medical Association (AMA) considers expert witness testimony to
be the practice of medicine.172 These reports derive from an AMA
resolution173 reflecting “current AMA policy . . . that expert witness
testimony is the practice of medicine subject to peer review.”174 Although a 1998 AMA Report of the Board of Trustees on expert witness testimony175 does not define “peer review,” the report does
state: “Several medical and specialty organizations are working to
deter false testimony. For example, the Florida Medical Association
(FMA) has developed a program by which physicians who falsely
testify are reported to the state licensing board for discipline. The
AMA is currently is [sic] studying programs like the FMA’s.”176
Therefore, the AMA policy, which considers expert witness testimony to be the practice of medicine, appears to contemplate licensure discipline for false testimony. Additional evidence for this
stance is the AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics.177 Opinion 9.07, Medical Testimony, provides, in relevant part: “Organized medicine, including state and specialty societies, and medical licensing boards
can help maintain high standards for medical witnesses by assessing claims of false or misleading testimony and issuing disciplinary sanctions as appropriate.”178
I do not know how well publicized the risk of medical license discipline is to potential medical expert witnesses (and physicians generally) as a sanction for false testimony. To the extent that license
discipline is a realistic sanction for false expert witness testimony,
the sanction is not worth the risk of the supposed common insur-

171.
172.

Id. at 946.
See B. Sonny Bal, The Expert Witness in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 467
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 383, 384–85 (2009); Juan Carlos B. Gomez, Silencing The Hired Guns—Ensuring Honesty in Medical Expert Testimony Through State Legislation, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 385, 393 (2005); Robert S. Peck & John Vail, Blame it on the Bee
Gees: The Attack on Trial Lawyers and Civil Justice, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 324, 334 (2006);
Russell M. Pelton, Medical Societies’ Self-Policing of Unprofessional Expert Testimony, 13
ANNALS HEALTH L. 549, 550, 552 (2004).
173. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 211 (1998).
174. Thoman R. Reardon, Report of the Board of Trustees: B of T Report 5–A–98 1 (1998),
http://truthinjustice.org/amareport.htm.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 4.
177. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS
(2014–2015 ed.).
178. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
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ance “plus” expert witness bias. The risk of discipline, in my estimation, makes less likely that the existence of common insurance
would influence expert testimony in favor of the defendant-physician.
B. The Risk That The Expert Will Be Disciplined By A Professional
Medical Society
The risk that an expert witness’ false testimony may lead to discipline by a professional medical society is not theoretical. At least
one author has suggested that professional medical societies play a
prominent role in the discipline of medical expert witnesses.179
Many professional medical societies, which are voluntary associations of physicians, and neither grant degrees nor board certification, have guidelines, policies, statements, and ethical opinions relating to expert witness testimony.180

179.
180.

See Pelton, supra note 172, at 552.
See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY, QUALIFICATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PHYSICIAN EXPERT WITNESS (June 25, 2005), https://www.aan.com/uploadedFiles/Website_Library_Assets/Documents/8.Membership/5.Ethics/1.Code_of_Conduct/MembershipEthics-American%20Academy%20of%20Neurology%20Qualifications%20and%20Guidelines%20for%20the%20Physician%20Expert%20Witness%20(2).pdf;
A M.
ACAD.
OF
OPHTHALMOLOGY, ADVISORY OPINION OF THE CODE OF ETHICS: EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
(Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.aao.org/ethics-detail/advisory-opinion--expert-witness-testimony; AM. ACAD. OF PAIN MED., GUIDELINES FOR EXPERT WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS AND
TESTIMONY (June 12, 2012), http://www.painmed.org/files/aapm-expert-witness-guidelines.pdf.; AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION NO.
374: EXPERT TESTIMONY (2016), http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Expert-Testimony; AM. COLL. OF RADIOLOGY, ACR
PRACTICE PARAMETER ON THE PHYSICIAN EXPERT WITNESS IN RADIOLOGY AND RADIATION
ONCOLOGY: RESOLUTION 9 (2017); AM. COLL. OF RHEUMATOLOGY, POLICY AND GUIDELINES
FOR EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION (June 22, 2015),
http://www.rheumatology.org/Portals/0/Files/ACR%20Policy%20and%20Guidelines%20for%20Expert%20Witness%20Testim
ony.pdf.; AM. SOC’Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR EXPERT WITNESS
QUALIFICATIONS AND TESTIMONY (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.asahq.org/about-asa/office-ofgeneral-counsel/expert-witness-testimony-review-program; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy
Statement, Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 109
PEDIATRICS 974 (2002); Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics, Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony
for Specialty of Medical Genetics, 2 GENETICS IN MED. 367 (2000); Ramsey M. Dallal et al.,
American Society of Metabolic and Bariatric Surgery Patient Safety Committee Policy Statement on the Qualifications of Expert Witnesses in Bariatric Surgery Medicolegal Matters, 8
SURGERY OBESITY & RELATED DISEASES. e9 (2012); Expert Witness Guidelines for the Specialty of Emergency Medicine, AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS (June 2015),
https://www.acep.org/Clinical---Practice-Management/Expert-Witness-Guidelines-for-theSpecialty-of-Emergency-Medicine; Statement on the Physician Acting as an Expert Witness,
AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS (Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.facs.org/about-acs/statements/8-expertwitness; Expert Witness Testimony in Medical Liability Cases, AM. UROLOGICAL ASS’N,
https://www.avanet.org/education/policy-statements/testiomony (last visited June 3, 2016).
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Austin v. American Association of Neurological Surgeons181 involved a medical society membership suspension of a neurosurgeon
as a result of his “irresponsible” expert testimony against another
neurosurgeon.182 Dr. Austin sued the AANS “claiming that he had
been suspended in ‘revenge’ for having testified as an expert witness for the plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit brought against
another member of the [AANS].”183 Procedurally, the suspension
occurred following a verdict for the defendant neurosurgeon and the
defendant’s complaint to the AANS, triggering the AANS disciplinary process.184 Dr. Austin’s lawsuit was resolved by summary
judgment in favor of the AANS.185 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, and after commenting on medical literature and
Dr. Austin’s related trial testimony, stated:
There is little doubt that his testimony was irresponsible
and that it violated a number of sensible-seeming provisions of the Association’s ethical code. These include provisions requiring that a member appearing as an expert witness should testify “prudently,” must “identify as such, personal opinions not generally accepted by other neurosurgeons,” and should “provide the court with accurate and
documentable opinions on the matters at hand.”186
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Austin187 certainly reveals and
supports the ability of a voluntary professional medical society to
discipline a member based upon that member’s “irresponsible” expert testimony.188 It was referred to more recently in the disposition
of another claim by a suspended member of a voluntary professional
medical society in Brandner v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons.189
In Brandner,190 a member of the “American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons . . . and its interrelated and parallel organization,
the American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons [collectively, the

181. Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2001).
182. Id. at 971.
183. Id. at 968.
184. Id. at 970.
185. Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
186. Austin, 253 F.3d at 971.
187. Id. at 967.
188. Id. at 971.
189. Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 10 C 8161, 2012 WL 4483820
(N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014).
190. Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820.
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‘AAOS’],”191 was “suspended . . . from membership based on certain
expert testimony he provided during a medical malpractice case.”192
Dr. Brandner filed suit against these professional societies, contending “that the AAOS’s sole intent was to punish and make an
example of him for offering expert testimony against another orthopedic surgeon who was a fellow member of the AAOS,”193 and the
failure “to follow their own bylaws, acting in bad faith and violating
his due process rights.”194 The trial court granted the AAOS motion
for summary judgment.195
After the resolution of the underlying case, the medical malpractice defendant, against whom Dr. Brandner testified, filed “a grievance report with the AAOS against Brandner.”196 The District
Court, in discussing the grievance procedure, noted that the AAOS
Committee on Professionalism recommended “that Brandner be
suspended from the AAOS for one year based on ‘unprofessional
conduct in the performance of expert witness testimony.’”197 After
action by the AAOS Board of Directors, and a rehearing of the matter, the Board voted to suspend Dr. Brandner for one year.198
Significantly, the District Court commented on the discretion of
voluntary associations in Illinois while conducting internal affairs,
stating:
In Illinois, voluntary associations have great discretion in
conducting their internal affairs, and their conduct is subject to judicial review only when they fail to exercise power
consistently with their own internal rules or when their
conduct violates the fundamental right of a member to a
fair hearing.199
Adding to its pronouncement of the great deference to be given to
the decisions of Illinois voluntary associations, the District Court
further stated that:

191. Id. at *1.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *4.
197. Id. at *6.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *8 (citing Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1151,
1152 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).

366

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 55

This Court’s limited review of an association’s actions regarding its members does not permit it to review whether
the decision was right or wrong, but simply whether it was
made without bias, prejudice or bad faith, by following
proper association procedures and in the absence of a due
process violation.200
The District Court opined that Dr. Brandner was not denied his due
process rights.201
Dr. Brandner appealed the District Court’s opinion to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which, in 2014, affirmed the opinion,
noting a scant record on appeal.202 Dr. Brandner’s claim against
the AAOS reveals that disciplinary action by a professional medical
society, although not as drastic as that by a medical licensing board,
is realistic following false testimony by a medical expert witness.
VI. CONCLUSION
The supposed bias of the defendant’s expert witness resulting
from sharing a professional liability insurer with the defendantphysician is misplaced. The expert’s financial interest in a defense
verdict is, at best, weak. The proof necessary to demonstrate this
theoretical bias would require the introduction into evidence of the
operation of a mutual insurance company and financial information
which would be unrelated to the issues at trial, likely incapable of
being understood by the jury, and, in my estimation, violate Federal
Rule of Evidence 403.203 The per se rule of admissibility adopted in
Ohio204 is excessively rigid, should be revisited by Ohio courts, and
eliminated.
The common insurance “plus” jurisdictions allow evidence of common insurance with additional evidence linking the defense expert
to the common insurer. Even in these jurisdictions, it is difficult to
establish how common insurance “plus” actually influences a defense expert’s testimony. In these jurisdictions, it is necessary to
discover the existence of common insurance, make this existence
known to the defendant’s expert witness before trial (likely during
a deposition) and overcome a motion in limine, pursuant to the

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at *12.
Id.
Brandner v. Am. Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 760 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014).
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, 642 N.E.2d 365, 368 (Ohio 1994).
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state’s version of Federal Rule of Evidence 403,205 to bar this evidence. Plaintiff, in opposition to the motion in limine, must assert
that evidence of common insurance “plus” is itself evidence of expert
witness bias, much like the evidentiary rule allowing impeachment
of a witness with a prior conviction.206 The weakness of this position, I submit, is the lack of a policy which underscores impeachment by prior conviction, requiring no causative link to specific false
testimony.207
Does common insurance, shared by the defendant-physician and
the defendant-physician’s expert witness actually cause false testimony in favor of the defendant-physician? This is a difficult question to answer but what appears certain is that the answer cannot
be discerned during the trial of a medical negligence case. These
cases are tried before lay juries, not blue ribbon juries.208 Neither
lawyers nor judges have the wherewithal to know if a medical expert witness is falsifying testimony, due to common insurance or
any other reason.209 What is known is that false expert testimony
is forbidden by numerous professional medical associations, is subject to discipline by them, and may constitute the practice of medicine, subjecting it to review and discipline by state medical licensing boards. Therefore, false expert witness testimony carries a potentially substantial professional risk.
The common insurance “plus” expert witness bias, not requiring
any causative link to identifiable false testimony, unfortunately
will likely remain part of the jurisprudence in those states which
have recognized it. Courts should understand, however, that the
claim of bias is tenuous and the evidence necessary to “prove” bias
will be time-consuming, distracting, and collateral to the issues central to the trial.

205. FED. R. EVID. 403.
206. FED. R. EVID. 609
207. See WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 136.
208. A blue ribbon jury would be comprised of more highly educated jurors or jurors from
the defendant’s profession. See Grant P. Du Bois, Jr., Desirability of Blue Ribbon Juries, 13
HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1962); Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J. L.
& POL’Y 19 (2007); Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative
Dispute Resolution?, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (1991); Harry H. Root, Medical Malpractice Litigation: Some Suggested Improvements and a Possible Alternative, 18 U. FLA. L. REV.
623 (1966).
209. For an opinion referring to “[t]he discomfort of the legal profession, including the
judiciary, with science and technology . . . .[,]” see Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 (7th
Cir. 2013) (commenting on the mistaken view of two judges regarding plaintiff’s medical condition). See also Root, supra note 208, at 631.

